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NOTES
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER
ALIEN CORPORATIONS IN ANTITRUST
ACTIONS: TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM
APPROACH
INTRODUCTION
Section 12 of the Clayton Act rests venue in antitrust suits
against corporations "not only in the judicial district whereof it is
an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or
transacts business" and allows service of process "in the district of
which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found."' Although
the jurisdictional import of section 12 is not explicit, most federal
courts have gleaned from it a federal predicate for the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction. 2 Other courts, however, reluctant to ascribe
'15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). In its entirety, Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in
any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such
cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may
be found.
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
2 E.g., Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1977); B.J. Semel Assocs.,
Inc. v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 827, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1975); see notes 37 & 89 and
accompanying text infra. See generally 16M J. VON KAUNOWSKI, ANTraUST LAws AND TRADE
REGULATION § 104.04151[a] (1978). No federal statute of general applicability affords an ex-
press predicate for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342
F.2d 546, 548 (4th Cir. 1965); 7 VILL. L. REv. 117, 117 (1961). Other federal jurisdictional
predicates have been utilized in antitrust actions because of the uncertainty surrounding
section 12's jurisdictional significance. In actions involving patent violations by alien defend-
ants, plaintiffs have successfully established in personam jurisdiction by invoking 35 U.S.C.
§ 293 (1976), which confers long-arm jurisdiction in the District of Columbia based on the
situs of a United States patent there. E.g., United States v. Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G.,
[19681 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 76,569 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 958 (1968); see Gerber
Scientific Instrument Co. v. Barr & Stroud, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1238, 1240 (D. Conn. 1973);
Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 227 (D.N.J. 1966). Similarly,
although it has not yet been implemented in the antitrust context, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976), provides a jurisdictional predicate
for foreign sovereigns acting in their commercial capacities. See Velvel, Antitrust Suits by
Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 & n.94 (1975).
In contrast, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over antitrust violations by alien
defendants is rarely problematic. Under the rule laid down by Judge Learned Hand in
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to the statute any jurisdictional significance per se,3 have adhered
to the principles found in state long-arm statutes.4 The relative
merit of employing state jurisdictional conventions or the federal
standard arguably embodied in section 12 seems to be a largely ac-
ademic question where the amenability of domestic corporations is
at issue;5 since the components of antitrust venue and state long-
arm jurisdiction are often analytically indistinguishable,' a juris-
dictional inquiry under either is likely to produce the same result.
In the context of alien corporations, however, significance attaches
to the jurisdictional basis used. While most state long-arm statutes
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945), the federal
courts have jurisdiction over the acts of foreign corporations if those acts are intended to
have a substantial effect on American commerce and do in fact have such an adverse effect.
For a general discussion of the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws to
foreign violations, see Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70
DicK. L. REv. 187 (1966); Fukuda, Jurisdiction in International Application of United States
Antitrust Laws, 12 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rxv. 125 (1963); Haight, International Law and the Extra-
territorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954); Note, Enforcement of
United States Antitrust Laws Over Alien Corporations, 43 GEO. L.J. 661, 661-62 (1955).
' See, e.g., McGuire v. Singer Co., 441 F. Supp. 210, 212-13 & n.2 (D.V.I. 1977); cf.
Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 870-73 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) ap-
plies to service; in personam jurisdiction is function of minimum contacts with state); 1
MooRE'S FEDERAL PRAMCrE 0.140[1.-1], at 1309 (2d ed. 1979) (venue provisions of 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 incorrectly labelled as jurisdictional).
Merely from its language, § 12 does notappear to prescribe a federal standard of juris-
diction; ostensibly, the first clause addresseS venue and the second speaks to service of pro-
cess. McGuire v. Singer Co., 441 F. Supp. 210, 213 n.2 (D.V.I. 1977); see 51 CONG. REC.
14214, 15943 (1914). The legislative history of the Clayton Act is equally inconclusive on the
intended jurisdictional implications of § 12. In both the Senate and the House debates, the
legislators avoided an indiscriminate use of terms, see 51 CONG. REC. 9414, 9415, 9607, 14214,
15943 (1914), perhaps implicitly assigning to venue, service of process, and jurisdiction their
strictly theoretical meanings. In addition, there are strong indications that Congress did not
intend to affect the jurisdiction of the federal courts in any manner. One Senator noted:
"[W]here the jurisdiction is already given and the right already secured, this speaks of the
service of process and how it may be had-quite a different subject. There is no jurisdiction
conferred here, and no right conferred except as to where a suit may be brought and how
process may be served." Id. at 16048 (remarks of Sen. Chilton); see also id. at 9607, 9466,
9467, 16049. On the other hand, a proposal that would have directly addressed the jurisdic-
tional issue, see id. at 9416-17 (remarks of Rp. Cullop), was summarily dismissed as unnec-
essary and confusing. Id. at 9417 (remarks of Rep. Floyd). This may be evidence of a general
consensus that the matter received adequ.e coverage in the provision as enacted. See also
id. at 16274.
See notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra.
Cf. Bloch, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of US. Courts in Sherman Act Cases, 54
A.B.A.J. 781, 783 (1968) (issue of personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases not problematic);
Victor & Hood, Personal Jurisdiction, Venue & Service of Process in Antitrust Cases Involv-
ing International Trade: Amenability of Alien Corporations to Suit, 46 ANIRUsT L.J. 1063,
1079-80 (1977) (issue of personal jurisdiction in antitrust cases not problematic).
6 See note 39 and accompanying text ififra.
1980]
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allow worldwide service of process, federal courts have generally
noted the inability of section 12's process provision to reach corpo-
rate defendants that must be served outside the United States.7
These federal courts have permitted service on an alien corporation
only through an agent "found" in the country.' Necessity, there-
fore, apparently has prompted reliance on state jurisdictional stan-
dards for this class of defendants. Because of the significant num-
ber of foreign corporations engaging in international commerce
with the United States, the accountability of aliens for any Ameri-
can anticompetitive activity is a particularly important concern.,
This Note initially will examine the implementation of state
principles of jurisdiction in federal antitrust cases.'0 A discussion
and evaluation of the decisional law and statutory sources of a fed-
eral standard of amenability in antitrust actions will follow." Fi-
nally, a federal standard derived from existing law and supported
by judicial precedent will be suggested.' 2
' See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 329-30
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
- E.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 372 (D. Md.), aff'd, 554 F.2d
623 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); In re Siemens & Halske A.G., 155 F.
Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); In re Elec. & Musical Indus., Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892, 895
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); see notes 48-65 and accompanying text infra.
I Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559, 565 (1980) (increase in
interstate trade and advances in technology and transportation create need for more compre-
hensive jurisdictional standards).
Even though not subject to personal jurisdiction, antitrust defendants may suffer ad-
verse consequences through restraint and forfeiture of inventory pursuant to § 6 of the Sher-
man Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1976). See Note, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust
Laws: Delimiting the Reach of Substantive Law Under the Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REv.
1030, 1032 n.12 (1967). Section 76 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1976), has a
similar provision for imported goods. Although these provisions have been successfully uti-
lized in a number of actions, see cases cited in K. BREWSTER, ATrRUST AN AN MERcAN Busi-
NESS ABROAD § 9.1.2 (1958), it is generally conceded that resort to restraint and forfeiture is a
less desireable alternative to the antitrust plaintiff than a full-fledged adjudication yielding
a personally binding judgment. Id. Similarly, a corporation over whom personal jurisdiction
cannot be established may still be commercially and financially affected through the abroga-
tion of contract rights or the reassignment of property in which it has an interest, even
without making it a party to the proceedings. While this may provide a public examination
of the absent party's conduct, such indirect enforcement is likewise less desireable. Id. §
4.1.7.
10 See notes 20-31 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 32-97 and accompanying text infra.
Q2 See notes 98-111 and accompanying text infra.
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THE DIVERSE APPROACHES IN EXISTING LAW: FEDERAL VERSUS STATE
BASES OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in personam relates to the power of a court to sub-
ject a defendant to its adjudication through the issuance of process
and to render an enforceable judgment.'3 Modern formulations of
personal jurisdiction 4 thus involve a double-faceted inquiry: the
amenability of the defendant to suit in a particular forum'5 and the
sufficiency of the notice afforded him.'" The concept of amenability
may be defined as the existence of circumstances that connect the
forum, the defendant, and the facts of the case so that it is fair and
reasonable for the court to assert jurisdiction over a party. 7 The
judicial power vested in a court as a result of these contacts, how-
ever, may be exercised only following service of process, which gen-
erally fulfills the notice requirement.' s Thus, service of process, al-
though not an independent source of power over a defendant, is a
prerequisite to the exercise of personal jurisdiction founded upon
sufficient grounds.'9
State Long-Arm Statutes
Tentativeness on the part of courts in extending the reach of
section 12's process clause to include service in foreign countries"
, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Japan Gas Lighter
Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.N.J. 1966); Victor & Hood, supra note 5, at
1065; Note, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 268, 268 n.3 (1962).
" Notions of personal jurisdiction have undergone great changes since its early territo-
rial philosophy. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) with Green v. Chicago B. &
Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). For a discussion of the doctrinal devel-
opment of personal jurisdiction through International Shoe, see 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROcEDURE § 1067 (1969 & Supp. 1979).
15 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, -100 S. Ct. 559, 564 (1980); Foster,
Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in
District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 83-85 (1968).
B See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1950); Fos-
ter, supra note 15, at 83-84.
11 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); REsTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONrICT OF LAws §§ 37-38 (1971); Foster, supra note 15, at 85.
1S Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950); 16M J. VON
KALiOwsKI, supra note 2, at §§ 104.01, 104.03[1].
1g See generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Miller, Implementing Current Theories of Jurisdiction, Venue and Service of Pro-
cess-Proposals for Revision of the Ohio Statutes, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 116, 120, 127 (1968).
Constitutional considerations of due process require that service be reasonably calculated to
apprise the defendant of the pendency of the proceedings against it. Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); Miller, supra, at 120.
11 Only a few courts have adopted the construction that § 12 authorizes foreign service.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:330
has been one factor triggering recourse to local procedural law in
antitrust cases.21 It is settled that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure authorize the use of local procedural law even in cases exclu-
sively within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.2
Thus, it cannot reasonably be debated that the use of state juris-
dictional standards in antitrust suits is at least technically permis-
sible. The transaction of business and "tortious act" provisions of
state long-arm statutes have most frequently been invoked to se-
cure jurisdiction.2 Where jurisdiction is predicated upon a transac-
tion of business by the defendant within the state, these courts
have reasoned that, because the defendant's forum activity has ful-
E.g., Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(service allowed in Italy by registered mail). Although the Hoffman rule comports with judi-
cial interpretations of similarly worded provisions, see, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-40 (2d Cir. 1972) (15 U.S.C. § 78aa); SEC v. Briggs,
234 F. Supp. 618, 621-22 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa), and other courts
have concurred by implication, see Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour, Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D.
Neb. 1976), the number of courts subscribing to Hoffman's reasoning has been unimpressive,
see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,594 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The hesitancy by the Hoffman and Zenith Radio courts can be shown, however, by
their alternative holdings that service had also been valid under state law. See 402 F. Supp.
at 329-30; 244 F. Supp. at 80.
o2, See Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659
(D.N.H. 1977); 2 MooRss FEDERAL PRACE 4.25[5] n.5, at 260-61 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 2 MOORE].
Other circumstances that appear to have triggered state long-arm analyses include the
forum non conveniens doctrine, see McGuire v. Singer Co., 441 F. Supp. 210 (D.V.I. 1977),
the assertion by the plaintiff of a non-pendent state claim supported only by diversity, in
addition to an antitrust claim, see id.; Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann,
A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977); McCrory Corp. v. Cloth World, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), the interposition of a federal claim, that does not receive the benefit of
extraterritorial service, in conjunction with an antitrust claim, see Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru
of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H. 1975); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo
S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the apparently inadvertent use of state means of
service of process, see Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1977), and a
determination that federal notions of piercing the corporate veil to obtain jurisdiction were
not applicable, see Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 849 (S.D. Fla. 1975), vacated
on other grounds sub nom. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th
Cir. 1977); 2 MooRE, supra, 4.25[6] n.37, at 278.
22 See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381 (1965); Wolfe v.
Doucette, 348 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1965); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F.
Supp. 123, 133 (D.N.H. 1975); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1257, 1259
(D.N.H. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 84 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35
F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), cited at 2
MOORE, supra note 21 4.01121], at 32; 4 C. WRIGHr & A. MILLEa, supra note 14, § 1115.
23 See, e.g., Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 847, 849 (S.D. Fla. 1975), va-
cated on other grounds sub nom. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d
1088 (5th Cir. 1977).
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filled the transaction of business requirement for venue under sec-
tion 12, those contacts also render jurisdiction proper.24 In contrast,
jurisdiction based upon the commission of a tortious act within the
state has been analytically more distinct. Under the so-called "tar-
get theory" of jurisdiction, conspiratorial activities without the
state having tortious consequences within the state may provide a
sufficient jurisdictional predicate.2 5 While the element of scienter
has figured prominently in some instances in which jurisdiction has
been upheld on a target basis, 26 the lesser threshold of foreseeabil-
ity under general tort principles has also sufficed. 2
2 See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 134 (D.N.H.
1975); McCrory Corp. v. Cloth World, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 322, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Hoffman
Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Some courts
have departed from the more traditional indicia of a "transaction of business" by finding
that the defendant had transacted business within the state by engaging in conduct else-
where which produced in-state effects giving rise to the cause of action. See, e.g., Centronics
Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 666-68 (D.N.H. 1977); Pa-
cific Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 338 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (D. Ore. 1972); Mari-
copa County v. American Petrofina, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 467, 469 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Albert
Levine Assocs. v. Bertoni & Cotti, S.p.A., 314 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see
Weinstein v. Norman M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 344, 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977); I.S.
Joseph Co. v. Mannesman Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023, 1024-25 (D. Minn. 1976).
25 See, e.g., Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1977); Cherokee
Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Servs. Inc., 383 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir. 1967); Hitt v.
Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 848 (S.D. Fla. 1975), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977); Jack
O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1002-04 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The "tar-
get theory" appears to derive its authority from McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957). See Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders' & Ex-
hibitors' Ass'n, 344 F.2d 860, 864-65 (9th Cir. 1965). In McGee, the Supreme Court sustained
the jurisdiction of a state court over a nonresident defendant based upon a finding that it
deliberately and intentionally brought about in the forum the alleged injuries. 355 U.S. at
223.
Analogizing the relevant policy considerations to those involved in products liability
cases, one court has concluded that there is "an even greater reason for reaching a manufac-
turer in antitrust cases-every buyer of such a 'tainted' product is injured and thus the
injury is widespread," whereas injuries due to defectively manufactured products tend to be
more localized and relatively infrequent. Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 847-48
(S.D. Fla. 1975), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust
Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco
Co., 388 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (D. Ore. 1972) (court analogized products liability cases in
laying venue on a target basis).
11 See, e.g., Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 848 (S.D. Fla. 1975), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th
Cir. 1977); Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
" See, e.g., Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 338 F. Supp. 842, 844-45
(D. Ore. 1972). It appears that, unlike the cases in which the co-conspirator theory of venue
was at issue, see note 44 infra, little concern has been expressed over the possibility that a
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Reliance on these statutes could result in irregular enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, 8 however, because of the disparities in
the scope .of the long-arm statutes of the several states. 2 Moreover,
determination on the merits may ultimately show that jurisdiction or venue was improper.
See Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moriates, 377 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pacific
Tobacco Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 338 F. Supp. 842 (D. Ore. 1972). But see West
Virginia v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 689, 696 (D. Minn. 1967).
The use of a ' target theory" of jurisdiction would appear to accord with the intent of
the framers of the Clayton Act to provide antitrust plaintiffs with the broadest procedural
discretion permissible under the Constitution, see note 99 infra, and at least one court has
laid venue under § 12 on a "target" basis, see Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. v. Tennessee Walking
Horse Breeders' & Exhibitors' Ass'n, 344 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1965). According to the Courtesy
Chevrolet court, a single act may be sufficient to fulfill the venue requirements under § 12's
"transaction of business" provision. Id. at 865; see Pacific Tobacco Corp. v. American To-
bacco Co., 338 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (D. Ore. 1972). The court cautioned, however, that "in
each case it is the totality of all the facts which determines whether the defendant is doing
business, or found" so as to establish amenability to service within a district. 344 F.2d at
865.
28 A striking example of irregular enforcement can be found by comparing I.S. Joseph
Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Minn. 1976), with Centronics
Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977). In these
cases, the same defendant, based upon comparable allegations and activities within each
state, was found to be subject to the long-arm jurisdiction of New Hampshire, id. at 668, but
unamenable to the judicial power of a federal court sitting in Texas, 408 F. Supp. at 1025.
See also Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354, 356 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1967); Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 549 (4th Cir. 1965).
29 Two types of long-arm statutes are most adaptable to antitrust violations by alien
defendants: the provisions that extend jurisdiction to due process limitations and the so-
called split-tort provisions. State long-arm statutes judicially construed to be coextensive
with constitutional due process include those enacted in Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. 2 MOORE, supra note 21, 4.25[7]
n.21, at 287-88.
Split-tort statutes permit personal jurisdiction based upon conduct occurring outside
the state but having in-state effects. Several varieties of split-tort statutes exist, of which the
most straightforward predicates jurisdiction on the occurrence of in-state injury, see 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(4) (Purdon 1979). More commonly, however, other conditions are
also imposed. The more permissive statutes allow the assertion of personal jurisdiction based
on the commission of a tortious act having foreseeable consequences in the state by a defen-
dant who derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW. § 302(a)(e)(ii)
(McKinney 19721. Others permit the exercise of jurisdiction based on foreseeable forum
consequences plus other business activities with that particular state. See, e.g., IND. CODE 34-
5-1-1 § 4.4(3) (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(d) (West 1979); VA. CODE § 8.01-
328.1(A)(4) (Supp. 1979). Moreover, two states have effectively codified the Hanson v.
Denckla test, see 357 U.S. 235 (1958), of purposeful availment of the benefits of state law as a
jurisdictional standard. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.181(1) (West 1969); Wyo. STAT. § 40-13-
108(c) (1977).
Although more equivocal in their applicability to antitrust violations by nonresidents,
statutes authorizing jurisdiction based upon the commission of a tortious act "within the
state," see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1979), or "in whole or in
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some states have refused either statutorily or judicially to extend
their long-arm powers to constitutional limits,30 and in light of doc-
trinal changes presently being effected in the area of state court
jurisdiction,31 the validity of applying long-arm statutes to less
targetive anticompetitive effects would seem to be questionable.
For these reasons and others, some courts have applied a federal
standard independent of the territorial and doctrinal constraints
that restrict state court jurisdiction.
Section 12 of the Clayton Act and Scophony
The majority of courts engaging in jurisdictional analyses
under the antitrust laws have relied on federal standards of amena-
bility.32 The most commonly used predicate for obtaining in per-
sonam jurisdiction over corporate antitrust defendants has been
section 12 of the Clayton Act. Conducive to interpretation as either
a plenary grant of national jurisdiction3 or an embodiment of the
traditional minimum contacts standard," the statute arguably
serves as a jurisdictional basis.35 Since service of process is prob-
part within the state," see, e.g., TEx. CIv. CODE ANN. tit. 42, § 2031(b)(4) (Vernon Supp.
1980), have been interpreted sufficiently broadly by some courts in other contexts to be ame-
nable to use in antitrust actions. See generally Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). But see Centronics Data Computer Corp. v.
Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977). Nevertheless, some states still adhere
to more rigid tests of corporate presence, and thus their long-arm statutes may be unavail-
ing. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 5-4-240 (1977) (transaction of business).
0 See 2 MOORE, supra note 21, T 4.25[7] & n.22, at 287-88.
3, See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court held that the "minimal contacts" test of state court juris-
diction mandated more substantial contacts with the forum state than "the fortuitous cir-
cumstance that a single... automobile, sold in New York to New York residents, happened
to suffer an accident while passing through Oklahoma." Id. at 566.
Of significance in the antitrust area was the Court's determination that foreseeability,
in and of itself, is no talisman of constitutionality. Id. The Court apparently distinguished
between probable, or even inevitable, extraterritorial effects and more calculated conse-
quences. Id. Since all colorable substantive antitrust claims except price-fixing must be sub-
stantial, see Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos": Constructing a Normative Theory of the
Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 733, 747 n.57 (1977),
it is apparent that the foreseeability factor will be maximized in jurisdictional inquiries
under the antitrust laws. Therefore, World-Wide Volkswagen may serve to limit the reach of
state court jurisdiction over antitrust offenders.
4 See notes 37-97 and accompanying text infra.
3 See notes 89-97 and accompanying text infra.
31 See notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
3 It has also been suggested that the conjunction of venue and process provisons in one
statutory section imparts jurisdictional significance to the statute, notwithstanding that
neither in isolation embodies a jurisdictional standard. See 65 MicH. L. REv. 395, 399 & n.25
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lematic,5 however, the benefit of section 12 in the context of alien
defendants remains equivocal.
Most -courts addressing the jurisdictional implications of section
12 have developed the test that once venue has been properly rested
under the statute, nationwide service of process will satisfy the
requirements of in personam jurisdiction. 7 Thus, under this
view, the defendant must generally have minimal contacts with the
district in which suit is brought. By conditioning jurisdiction and
the availability of nationwide service on prior fulfillment of section
12's venue criteria,38 these courts have implicitly recognized the co-
incidence between the components of antitrust venue and the
traditional state court indicia of minimum contacts. 9 Section 12
(1966); cf. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 238 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (historical conjunction of federal venue and process provisions in the Judiciary
Act of 1879 does not indicate that the federal venue statute "has always been a venue provi-
sion and nothing more").
36 See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
17 See, e.g., Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750,
752 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977); Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 317 (E.D. Pa. 1975); McCrory Corp. v.
Cloth World, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 322, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); C.C.P. Corp. v. Wynn Oil Co.,
354 F. Supp. 1275, 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1973); United States v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 247 F.
Supp. 185, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Smit, International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1031, 1039-40 n.45 (1961). Several formulations of the "venue-plus-service
equals jurisdiction" concept have emerged. One merely advances the theory that the exercise
of jurisdiction by a federal court of proper venue based on service of federal process is consti-
tutional. See Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14
VAND. L. REv. 967, 986 (1961). Another frames the applicable test in terms of pleading re-
quirements: in pleading venue, the plaintiff must allege the in personam jurisdictional re-
quirements of the forum. See McGhan v. F.C. Hayer Co., 84 F. Supp. 540, 541 (D. Minn.
1949); 16M J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 105.0212] n.35; Note, Venue in Private Anti-
trust Actions, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 268, 269 n.9 (1962). Other courts merely gloss over the con-
stitutional issue by making the conclusory statement that in light of the venue findings,
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would not be offended by the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendant. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
402 F. Supp. 262, 328-29 (E.D. Pa. 1975); cf. Fooshee v. Interstate Vending Co., 234 F. Supp.
44, 52 (D. Kan. 1964) (Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15). For the converse proposition that
the court lacks personal jurisdiction on the ground of insufficient service of process due to
improper venue, see Phillip Gall & Son v. Garcia Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (E.D. Ky.
1972). For a proposal that even when federal jurisdiction is based on diversity, personal
jurisdiction should exist where venue is proper, see Comment, A Proper Basis forAmenability
to Process in Federal Diversity Cases, 42 Miss. L.J. 375, 389 (1971).
- Athletes Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445 F. Supp. 35, 45 (D. Del. 1977);
I.S. Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023, 1024-25 (D. Minn.
1976); Phillip Gall & Son v. Garcia Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (E.D. Ky. 1972); Raul
Int'l Corp. v. Nu-Era Gear Corp., 28 F.R.D. 368, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); cf. 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
158, 165 (1975) (securities laws).
31 Compare International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) with O.S.C.
Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). In deter-
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posits venue standards comparable to now-familiar tests of state
court jurisdiction that have already passed constitutional muster. 0
At least as narrow as the jurisdictional inquiry that traditionally
precedes it,' the special antitrust venue statute serves to ensure
that a specific calculus of contacts exists between the litigant and
the forum.12 Inasmuch as initial resort to section 12 venue merely
avoids a duplicative jurisdictional inquiry,4 it may seem that the
mining that the defendant did not transact business within the meaning of § 12, the court in
O.S.C. Corp. considered the following factors, which are also used in a mimimum contacts
jurisdictional analysis: whether the defendant was registered to do business, whether it
owned or leased real propery, whether it maintained a bank account, whether it had sales-
men, dealers, jobbers, or other agents for any business purposes, whether it solicited busi-
ness, whether it had a branch office, and whether it warehoused inventory in the state. Id. at
1066; cf. Sunrise Toyota, Ltd. v. Toyota Motor Co., 55 F.R.D. 519, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(finding of agency under state law for purposes of jurisdiction over defendant on state claims
satisfies venue requirements of § 4 of Clayton Act).
11 See 16M J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 804 n.13.
41 Victor & Hood, supra note 5, at 1065.
42 Id.
43 See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 464 & n.4 (1962); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP
Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 923 (1977); Phillip Gall & Son v. Garcia Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (E.D. Ky.
1972); 16M J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 2, § 105.02[2]; Victor & Hood, supra note 5, at
1065; cf. Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790, 794 (N.D. 111. 1958) (confusion
caused by overlap between venue provision and criteria for in personam jurisdiction); Ron-
son Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Brown & Bigelow, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 716, 724 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd
per curiam, 199 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1952) ("doing business" under general venue statute same
as doing business for jurisdictional purposes).
A duplicative inquiry may even occur when courts lay venue in antitrust actions "where
the claim arose" under the general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976), rather than
under § 12. These courts have reasoned that resting venue at the locus of the injury, as is
done in tort actions arising under state law, is inappropriate because "antitrust actions are
not susceptible to such simplistic rationale" and therefore have engrafted a due process type
of qualification on the use of the "where the claim arose" provision. See Philadelphia Hous.
Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 260 (E.D. Pa.
1968). Thus, a "weight of the contacts" test has been applied under which venue may be
rested pursuant to the "where the claim arose" provision only in a district in which, for
example, significant sales causing substantial injury were made by the defendant or overt
acts constituting a significant and substantial element of the offense were committed. Id. at
260-61; see Athletes Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445 F. Supp. 35, 45 & n.30 (D.
Del. 1977); Goggi Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 422 F. Supp. 361, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Ghazoul v. International Management Servs. Inc., 398 F. Supp. 307, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 574 (N.D.
I1. 1975); Redmond v. Atlantic Coast Football League, 359 F. Supp. 666, 669-70 (S.D. Ind.
1973).
In Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A. v. Moraites, 377 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), however,
the court inferentially rejected the possibility that a minimum contacts-type inquiry was
relevant in the determination of venue under the general venue provisions to the extent that
it involved "an evaluation of a specific calculus of contacts." Id. at 647. Even that court
tempered the literal application of the statute, however, by requiring an allegation of specific
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only substantial objection that can be raised is that this reasoning
evidences a degree of analytical imprecision, since, logically, juris-
diction should be obtained before it is determined whether venue is
proper." There is authority, however, that antitrust venue and the
requirements for the constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction
may not necessarily be coextensive.1 Facile reliance on the provi-
intent. Id. at 647-48.
Thus, because a due process inquiry is already made, it appears that compliance with
these venue provisions will ensure that maintenance of suit in a district of proper venue will
present no affront to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
" Victor & Hood, supra note 5, at 1065. In Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710
(1979), the Supreme Court held it proper to make a venue determination prior to ruling on a
jurisdictional claim if it would allow the pretermission of the constitutional issues involved in
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 2715-16.
One method of laying venue in antitrust actions that does not replicate a minimum
contacts inquiry is the so-called co-conspirator theory of venue. Under this theory, the acts
of one corporation party to an illegal combination may establish venue as to its co-conspira-
tors if its in-state activities include a conspiratorial agreement or an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy and if the acts or agreements may be said to constitute a transaction of
business. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 96-98
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972); California Clippers, Inc. v. United States Soccer Football Ass'n, 314 F. Supp. 1057,
1065 (N.D. Cal. 1970); West Virginia v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 689, 691-92 (D.
Minn. 1967); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 208 F. Supp. 926, 941-42
(N.D. Ill. 1962); Periodical Distribs., Inc. v. American News Co., [1961] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
70,011 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Ross-Bart Port Theatre, Inc. v. Eagle Lion Films, Inc., 140 F. Supp.
401, 403 (E.D. Va. 1954). The use of the theory was first sanctioned to sustain the validity of
service of process under a California long-arm statute in Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Indus., Inc.,
156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 787 (1946). The Giusti court reasoned that the
resident conspirators were agents of the out-of-state parties and that the perpetration of
monopolistic practices was tantamount to a transaction of business within the state. Id. at
354. Although the court expressly indicated that venue under § 12 was not at issue, id. at
354-55, the co-conspirator theory has since been used to rest antitrust venue as well.
While this approach has been supported by many commentators on the ground that it
comports with the remedial purposes of the antitrust laws, see, e.g., Comment, Venue Under
the Clayton Act for Private Antitrust Suits, 9 SYRACUSE L. REv. 159 (1957); 41 MnNe. L. REv.
837, 839 (1957), many arguments may be advanced against the predication of venue on the
in-state acts of a defendant's alleged co-conspirator. As a practical matter, since the propri-
ety of venue depends on the verity of the conspiracy allegation, venue determinations will
largely involve determinations on the merits. Byrnes, Bringing the Co-Conspirator Theory of
Venue Up-To-Date and Into Proper Perspective, 11 ANrrRUST BuLL. 889, 895 (1966); see
West Virginia v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 689, 695 (D. Minn. 1967); Ziegler Chem. &
Mineral Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 32 F.R.D. 241, 243 (N.D. Cal. 1962). One court, however,
has been willing to overlook this duplication if there is proof of scienter. See Hitt v. Nissan
Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 848 (S.D. Fla. 1975), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re
Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977). Most importantly,
the co-conspirator theory has been severely discredited in Supreme Court dictum. In Bank-
ers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953), the Court designated it as a "frivolous
albeit ingenious attempt to expand the [venue] statute." Id. at 384.
11 See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123, 134 (D.N.H. 1975);
Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 377 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 554 F.2d 623 (4th
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sions of section 12 to secure personal jurisdiction over domestic
defendants may therefore beg any constitutional issue involved,
thereby guaranteeing due process only incidentally. More signifi-
cantly, however, a venue inquiry will not reinforce the probability
of this type of forum connection in the case of the alien defendant,
since section 1391(d) of title 28 of the United States Code permits
plaintiffs to rest venue over aliens "in any district."" Furthermore,
because process cannot be served outside the United States under
this jurisdictional view of the statute, 47 aliens not present within
the United States may effectively evade jurisdiction.
In an attempt to overcome this problem, plaintiffs have sought
to establish that the foreign corporation, through an agent, trans-
acts business or may be "found" in the district in which the federal
courts sits. The seminal case in this area is United States v.
Scophony Corp. of America." In Scophony, a British manufacturer
(British Scophony) of television and transmission apparatus negoti-
ated a series of agreements with American motion picture and tele-
vision interests whereby Scophony Corporation of America (Amer-
ican Scophony) was formed as a jointly owned company to promote
British Scophony's inventions in the United States." When an ac-
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F.
Supp. 70, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts Over
Foreign Corporations, 69 HARv. L. Rxv. 508, 508 (1956) (doing business within meaning of
the venue statute distinguishable from doing business for jurisdictional purposes). Moreover,
use of a venue provision as a cure for more fundamental jurisdictional defects may be inap-
propriate. See Comment, Transfer in the Federal Courts in the Absence of Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 61 COLUNs. L. REv. 902, 910 (1961); cf. Hohensee v. News Syndicate, Inc., 286 F.2d 527,
530 (3d Cir. 1961) (federal transfer provisions are not intended to be a means of avoiding
consequences of failure to secure proper service of process).
46 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1976).
'7 As a threshold observation, the applicability of the venue provision of § 12 to foreign
nationals seems highly questionable in light of the Supreme Court's statement in Brunette
Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972), that aliens are "wholly
outside the operation of all federal venue laws, general and special." Id. at 714. In holding
the alien venue statute to be exclusively applicable in suits against aliens, however, Bru-
nette may have ramifications in antitrust litigation above and beyond the singular issue of
venue. Since many courts have found that the operability of extraterritorial process against
corporate defendants depends on prior fulfillment of § 12's venue requirements, see note 38
and accompanying text supra, the extra-district service clause may be deemed unavailable
to reach an alien under this view. As a result, unless § 12 is viewed differently, see notes 106-
08 and accompanying text infra, service outside the district in which the federal court sits
may only be made in compliance with state jurisdictional standards through Rule 4(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see note 87 infra.
" 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
" Id. at 798-99. Under the terms of the agreements, British Scophony transferred to
American Scophony all its patents and other interests in its inventions in the Western
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tion was commenced in the Southern District of New York for al-
leged antitrust violations, service of process on British Scophony
was made in the district on the president and director of American
Scophony and on an individual who was a mortgagee and officer of
British Scophony and who held a comprehensive power of attorney
over the British corporation's interests in the United States. 0 Brit-
ish Scophony moved for dismissal on the grounds that it did not
transact business in the district within the meaning of section 12's
venue provision and that it was not "found" within New York for
purposes of service of process.51 Finding both venue and service
proper,52 the Scophony Court held that a "practical, everyday busi-
ness or commercial concept of doing or carrying on business 'of any
substantial character' " was contemplated in the determination of
venue under section 12.3 The activities of British Scophony in New
York through American Scophony were found sufficient to consti-
tute a "transaction of business" under this "practical, nontechnical
business standard."54 Moreover, "in view of his triple position as
mortgagee, corporate officer and attorney-in-fact," the corporate
agent served, for venue and service purposes, "was the company,"
and his presence in New York caused the defendant corporation to
be "found within the district." 5
A significant feature of the Scophony decision in the area of
personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate defendants was its
suspension of the traditional doctrine of "corporate separateness"
in venue determinations under section 12.11 As a general rule, the
presence of a wholly owned subsidiary within the district is insuffi-
cient, in and of itself, to subject the absent parent to personal ju-
risdiction.5 7 The Scophony Court noted, however, that when a cor-
Hemisphere, as well as its entire inventory in the United States. Id. at 799. The American
interests became exclusive licensees under American Scophony's patents, and British
Scophony was to receive one-half of all royalties from these licenses. Id.
5 Id. at 816, 818.
5' Id. at 801-02.
52 Id. at 818.
Id. at 807, 808.
Id. at 810.
" Id. at 816.
5' See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 262, 319
(E.D. Pa. 1975); In re Elec. & Musical Indus., Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 149 F. Supp. 830, 834-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
11 Fooshee v. Interstate Vending Co., 234 F. Supp. 44, 50-51 (D. Kan. 1964); 2 MooRE,
supra note 21, T 4.25[6], at 272. The Supreme Court has held that for jurisdictional pur-
poses, the legal separation of corporate entities is to be respected as long as "[tihe corporate
separation, though perhaps merely formal, is real." Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing
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porate structure is deliberately manipulated for purposes of
exploiting the American marketplace, the general rule will not ap-
ply.58 Thus, the Court was able to circumvent the doctrine of corpo-
rate separateness without expressly overruling it.
A finding of agency tends to be crucial to the assertion of juris-
diction over an alien not present within the United States.,9 Juris-'
diction has generally been dependent upon serving its American af-
filiate because section 12 has been interpreted as not providing for
worldwide service of process. It has therefore been necessary to es-
tablish that the alien defendant was "found" within the district
through the subsidiary and that the subsidiary qualified as agent
for service of process."0 The courts, therefore, have exhibited a will-
ingness to depart from the more conventional gauges of corporate
independence that have been dispositive in the case of the domes-
tic defendant:" Courts since Scophony have pierced the corporate
Co., 267 U.S. 333, 337 (1925).
2 The Court distinguished manufacturing and selling entities such as those involved in
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925), by finding that British
Scophony had originally pursued manufacturing and selling, but then shifted to a mode of
exploiting patents by complex working arrangements in the nature of a joint venture requir-
ing "constant supervision and intervention beyond the normal exercise of shareholders'
rights by the participating companies' representatives." Id. at 816; see Hitt v. Nissan Motor
Co., 399 F. Supp. 838, 842 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1975), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re
Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 552 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1977). There is some debate
whether Scophony implicitly overruled Cannon in the context of antitrust litigation. Com-
pare Frito Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Tex. 1973) with
O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam)
and United States ex rel. Martin-Trigona v. Bankamerica Corp., [1974-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
74,916 (D.D.C.).
11 Evasion of the corporate separation rule is not critical for antitrust plaintiffs if they
are suing domestic corporations. See Note, Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws
Over Alien Corporations, 43 GEO. L.J. 661, 664 (1955). As long as the defendant transacts
business in any federal district, it will be susceptible to suit there following service of process
upon it in the district of its incorporation. Id. Thus, as applied to American corporations,
the Scophony test merely serves to enhance the convenience of the plaintiff by multiplying
the number of districts in which § 12 venue will be proper.
Even in serving nonresident domestic corporations pursuant to § 12, however, plaintiffs
have occasionally complicated their jurisdictional burdens by serving process within the fo-
rum rather than in the district of the defendant's incorporation. See Schwartzbaum, Inc. v.
Evans, Inc., 44 F.R.D. 589, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Raul Int'l Corp. v. Nu-Era Gear Corp., 28
F.R.D. 368, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948); In re
Siemens & Halske A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); In re Elec. & Musical In-
dus., Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. United States Alkali
Export Ass'n, Inc., [1946-1949] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 57,481 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
1, Jurisdiction over American corporations has been upheld following a determination
that venue was proper as to a subsidiary where, for example, the parent has manifested
control over subsidiary decisionmaking through controlling stock ownership or interlocking
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veil if the domestic affiliate can be characterized as a partner in
directorates, see Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), and where the subsidiary functions as a sales or marketing arm of the absent
parent, see Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 391 F. Supp. 367, 372 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd, 554
F.2d 623 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
Although the Scophony Court rationalized its abrogation of the corporate separateness
doctrine on the basis of British Scophony's extraordinary anticompetitive activities through
its American subsidiary, see note 58 and accompanying text supra, the "noimal exercise of
shareholders' rights" by parent companies has been deemed sufficient to pierce the corporate
veil for jurisdictional purposes in the period since Scophony. See, e.g., Luria Steel & Trading
Corp. v. Ogden Corp., 327 F. Supp. 1345, 1348 (E.D. Pa. 1971). It thus appears that the
distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in the Scophony decision may have been a highly
artificial one. Indeed, it has been suggested that the impetus behind the suspension of the
traditional rule of corporate separation in Scophony was the alienage of the defendant,
rather than its specific anticompetitive intent. See Note, Enforcement of United States An-
titrust Laws Over Alien Corporations, 43 GEO. L.J. 661, 666 (1955).
The propriety of considering a defendant's alienage in determining its amenability to
jurisdiction of the federal courts, beyond the realm of the corporate separateness doctrine,
has been the subject of considerable commentary. Varying rationales have been advanced in
support of considering alienage. Some courts have found that because American courts are
available to alien defendants for the enforcement of their own rights, this should bring them
within the "purposeful avallment" test of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See
Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D. Conn. 1975); Note, Amenabil-
ity of Foreign Sovereigns to Federal In Personam Jurisdiction, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 487, 487
(1974). But see Williams v. Canon, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376, 379 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Gerber
Scientific Instruments Co. v. Barr & Stroud, Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1238, 1240 (D. Conn. 1973).
Others have postulated that it may be possible for a foreign corporation to do substantial
business within the nation as a whole, while its aggregated contacts with any one domestic
forum would not be sufficient to support personal jurisdiction. Thus, when a selection must
be made not among domestic forums but between a domestic and a foreign forum, the pref-
erence for the local tribunal becomes more compelling. See Centronics Data Computer Corp.
v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.N.H. 1977); Engineered Sports Prods. v.
Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973). But see 2 MOORE, supra note 21,
4.25[5], at 262 (1979). It has likewise been suggested that the relative size of the defendant's
operations and its international perspective may make it more reasonable to require it to
defend in forums more distant or inconvenient than otherwise. See Engineered Sports Prods.
v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973). Concerns for convenience of the
defendant also seem to have been lightly dismissed when an alien is involved. For example,
one court has noted that "[w]hen a defendant is a citizen of the United States, there are
very real differences in convenience between litigating in a state where it does business or
resides, and in one where it has only insignificant contacts . . . . The considerations are
entirely different, however, when an alien is involved . . . .[An alien defendant often] has
no reason based on fairness to prefer any one particular district to any other." Cryomedics,
Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 292 (D. Conn. 1975); see Centronics Data Computer
Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 663 (D.N.H. 1977). See also United States v.
Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
The notion that a different standard of amenability may be applied to alien defendants
is not without its skeptics, however. See United States v. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd.,
[1948-1949] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,248 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); United States v. Scophony Corp.
of America, 69 F. Supp. 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), rev'd and remanded, 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
But see Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 364 F. Supp. 243, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (citing
Boryk v. deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965)). Indeed, it has been sug-
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worldwide competition" or the alter ego of the alien parent., More-
over, such a finding will not be precluded even if the United States
corporation was not itself instrumental or implicated in the perpe-
tration of the alleged antitrust violations, provided the American
corporation is found to be "a mere adjunct of its parent.""4 Where
this occurs, the activities of the absent parent are imputed to the
American subsidiary. 5
While assertion of personal jurisdiction over aliens through ser-
vice on American agents has expanded,"6 this approach is not en-
tirely satisfactory; several courts still adhere nominally to the
traditional rule of corporate separation in quashing service upon
domestic agents,6" despite the general repudiation of the rule in the
gested that more substantial activity within the United States should be required to bring a
foreign national into an American court than to bring a citizen of the United States into a
court of a sister state. "[T]he preparation and documentation of a case for trial in the
United States may be vastly more difficult for the foreign corporation than for the firm
which does most of its business here." K. BREWSTER, supra note 9, § 4.1.1.
12 See In re Elec. & Musical Indus., Ltd., 155 F. Supp. 892, 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
1 See In re Siemens & Halske A.G., 155 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Pre-
Scophony cases had upheld service on a wholly owned American subsidiary only where a
contractual stipulation of general agency existed between the subsidiary and its parents. See
United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., [1946-1947] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
57,481 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
11 See United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp.
40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). See generally K. BREWSTER, supra note 9, § 4.1.5; W. FUGATE, FOREIGN
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws § 3.5 (2d ed. 1973).
1 United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 40, 45
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
11 See Note, Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws Over Alien Corporations, 43
GEo. L.J. 661, 664 (1955).
67 See, e.g., Intermountain Ford Tractor Sales Co. v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 210 F. Supp.
930, 938-39 (D. Utah 1962), aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 931 (1964). Proponents of the rule of corporate separateness cite possible adverse effects
on international trade, see 210 F. Supp. at 932, and the possibility of reciprocally lenient
treatment of American corporations by foreign courts, see 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 249, 255
(1974). While reliance on the rule may appear incompatible with later Supreme Court deci-
sions, see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), it is submitted
that reference to the traditional doctrine of corporate separation may often be misleading.
An illustration may be found in Hayashi v. Sunshine Garden Prods., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 632
(W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hayashi v. Red Wing Peat Corp., 396 F.2d 13
(9th Cir. 1968), wherein an Ohio corporation was sued for alleged antitrust violations in
Washington. Its only contact with the state was through a wholly owned Canadian subsidi-
ary that engaged in some business activity within the forum. 285 F. Supp. at 633. The court
refused to exercise jurisdiction because the two corporations had maintained the requisite
degree of separation prescribed by Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333
(1925). 285 F. Supp. at 634; see O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064 ,(9th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam). It is suggested, however, that because the subsidiary was a nonresi-
dent of the forum state, itself subject to jurisdiction and process only extraterritorially, the
merits of the case are considerably weaker than in cases in which the absent parent's subsid-
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antitrust context. Additionally, analyses under the Scophony cor-
porate separateness test still evince the parochial orientation that
is characteristic of state court analyses" and may thus be unduly
restrictive. Most importantly, however, service on an American
agent continues to be unavailing where the alien corporation has
successfully avoided even the appearance of domestic association.
Although it did not directly comment on the jurisdictional implica-
tions of section 12,9 the Scophony Court intimated, and the weight
of commentary agrees,70 that unless an American subsidiary may
be deemed either the agent or alter ego of an alien corporation, or
the defendant is sufficiently "present" within the United States in
its own right, service of process may not be obtainable.7' Accord-
ingly, this particular class of defendants may effectively enjoy ju-
risdictional immunity. Thus, even juxtaposing the Scophony rule
with state long-arm statutes, a reasonably comprehensive scheme
for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over alien defendants is
not established. 71
iary is present within the forum.
11 See, e.g., O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam).
11 While the Scophony Court apparently disavowed the notion that its decision deline-
ated a jurisdictional standard for antitrust litigation, see 333 U.S. at 804 n.13, its emphasis
on practicality and reasonableness clearly resounded the doctrinal changes previously ef-
fected in the area of personal jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). Indeed, in reaching its conclusion, the Court strained to distinguish the
Cannon line of cases which, because they dealt specifically with the assertion of personal
jurisdiction, did not necessarily appear apposite to the validity of service in its insular sense.
See notes 13-19 and accompanying text supra.
" See, e.g., 2 MooRE, supra note 21, T 4.25[5] & n.5, at 260-61; Beausang, The Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DICK. L. REv. 187, 193-94, 196 (1966); Kintner,
Joelson & Vaghi, Groping for a Truly International Antitrust Law, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 75, 84
(1973); Note, Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws Over Alien Corporations, 43 GEO.
L.J. 661, 664 (1955); Note, Venue in Private Antitrust Suits, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 268, 278 (1962);
Note, Long-Arm Application of the Sherman Antitrust -Act to Industry in the Central
American Common Market, 22 U. FLA. L. Rav. 235, 241 (1969).
1, 333 U.S. at 817. The Court stated that "process could not be issued to run for such
corporations to the foreign countries of which they are 'inhabitants.' " Id.
72 One court has fashioned a broadly defined "fairness test" aimed at accommodating
both the due process rights of the defendant and the regulatory nature of the antitrust rem-
edy. See Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
Although Oxford First was a securities fraud action in which process was served pursuant to
the venue and extraterritorial process provision of the securities laws, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1976), the court indicated that the antitrust laws should be analyzed in the same manner.
372 F. Supp. at 201, 205. After finding that venue was proper, id. at 198, the court consid-
ered the plaintiff's assertion that a combination of proper venue and extraterritorial service
of process fulfilled the requirements of in personam jurisdiction, id. at 196. While acknowl-
edging that the venue requirement served as a statutory limitation on extraterritorial ser-
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Section 12 of the Clayton Act and the Aggregate Contacts Test
of Jurisdiction
Under another federal jurisdictional test, which has been infre-
quently invoked, federal courts have recognized that, in federally
created causes of action, they may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any defendant present within the United States on traditional
territorial principles.7" The case originating this jurisdictional stan-
dard-the national contacts test-is First Flight Co. v. National
Carloading Corp.74 The First Flight court observed that as a funda-
mental jurisdictional tenet, a sovereignty has personal jurisdiction
over any defendant within its territorial limits, subject only to the
ability of its courts to obtain service upon the defendant. 5 The
court concluded, therefore, that "the material constitutional in-
quiry in [federal question cases] concerns not contacts with the
physical territory of the court, but rather contacts with the sover-
eignty of which the court is an arm. And the sovereignty of which a
federal court is an arm is, of course, the United States. '
7
The import of this theory in the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion over domestic defendants is to create personal jurisdiction na-
tionally; as long as the defendant has the requisite minimum con-
tacts with any federal district, jurisdiction in all districts will be
proper.77 In comparison, where an alien is the defendant, federal
vice, id. at 203 n.24, the Oxford First court concluded that treating venue as a restriction on
nationwide service of process was not dispositive of the issue of in personam jurisdiction. Id.
Instead of applying a strict constitutional standard comprised of traditional due process cri-
teria, the court formulated a test in which the following factors were to be given equal
weight: the extent of the defendant's contacts with the district in which the action is insti-
tuted; inconvenience to the defendant, calculated with reference to the interstate nature of
its business, its distance from the forum, and its access to local counsel; judicial economy,
including any possible adverse effects upon the integrity of the litigation; the probable situs
of discovery; and the nature of the regulated activity and the extent to which the defen-
dant's acts have an extraterritorial effect. Id. at 203-05. While the Oxford First fairness test
may indeed be a creditable attempt to incorporate all the considerations that should bear on
the question of amenability in areas such as securities and antitrust, it has not generally
been followed. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979). See gener-
ally 7 RUT.-CAhi. L.J. 158 (1975).
13 See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
1, 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). In First Flight, the plaintiff brought an action
under 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1976)) against a
shipper for alleged damage to cargo during shipment.
7 209 F. Supp. at 736.
7' Id. at 738.
See Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 358 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Alco Standards Corp.
v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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courts have exercised personal jurisdiction in federal question cases
if the alien's contacts with the United States as a whole satisfy the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.78 In determining whether
there is a sufficient nexus, the alien's American contacts have been
aggregated, even though its affiliation with any one federal district
would be insufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of the state in
which the court sits. 79 This jurisdictional predicate is known as the
Implementation of a territorial sovereignty theory was a constitutionally valid option
available to Congress when it undertook to organize the federal court system. See Barrett,
Venue and Service of Process in Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REv.
608, 608 (1954); Mandarino, Erie v. Tompkins: A Geography Lesson, 5 DuQ. L. REv. 465, 471
(1966-1967). Insofar as the lawmakers forewent the opportunity to create general nationwide
jurisdiction in the district courts, see Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Terri-
torial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REv. 520, 532 (1963), it may be suggested that
judicial attempts to do so through a national contacts standard of amenability are improper.
It should be remembered, however, that the organization of the district courts along state
lines was at least partially a product of political rather than jurisdictional concerns. See
Comment, A Proper Basis for Amenability to Process in Federal Diversity Cases, 42 Miss.
L.J. 375, 376 n.3 (1971); Comment, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REv.
421, 427 (1930). That the federal courts are territorially coterminous with the several states,
therefore, does not necessarily reflect any substantive determinations. Indeed, the Supreme
Court, although not speaking directly on the issue, has never indicated that the territorial
nature of the district courts is of jurisdictional import in federal question cases. See, e.g.,
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. Railroad
Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); United States v. Union Pac. RR., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04
(1878). The Court has stated that "the jurisdiction of the [District] Courts of the United
States is not created by, and does not depend on, the statutes of the several States." Barrow
Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 110 (1898). Moreover, the stress placed on the differ-
ence between diversity and federal question jurisdiction in more recent Supreme Court pro-
nouncements, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), would seem implicitly to render the Court's findings with respect to the
former inapplicable to the adjudication of federally created rights.
11 See Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D. Conn. 1975); Holt v. Klosters
Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 358 (W.D. Mich. 1973); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345
F. Supp. 14, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
1' See, e.g., Coats Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Equip. Co., 459 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1978)
(patent infringement claim); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (admiralty action); Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] TRADE
CAS. 1 74,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (antitrust action); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F.
Supp. 14, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (stock fraud action); 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435, 444 (1976);
cf. Note, Amenability of Foreign.Sovereigns to Federal In Personam Jurisdiction, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 487, 497-98 (1974) (aggregation of national contacts suited to exercise of jurisdiction
over foreign sovereigns). But see Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137,
1143 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975); Graham Eng'r Corp. v. Kemp Prods., Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 919 &
n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
The controlling case for the aggregation theory is Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd.,
397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). The Cryomedics plaintiff, a Connecticut corporation,
brought a patent infringement suit against a British corporation headquartered in Great
Britain. Process was served pursuant to Connecticut's long-arm statute as authorized by
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aggregate contacts theory." Of course, federal transfer provisions,
as well as the territorial constraints of federal process, are available
to remedy any special disabilities that may attach as a result of
this broadened susceptibility to suit."
The aggregate contacts test of jurisdiction has received only
limited consideration in the antitrust context. In one case consider-
ing the test, Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rub ber
Co.,82 a Greek corporation that sold plastic hose products to two
Ohio firms was sued for alleged Sherman Act violationsYs' The dis-
trict court, in dictum, embraced the notion that the United States
as a whole could be the territorial predicate for the exercise of in
personam jurisdiction in antitrust cases.8" It noted, however, that
Congress had failed to provide a means of service upon an alien
corporation when service upon a corporate agent within the United
States was not possible. 5 Concluding that service in the manner
prescribed by state law was its only alternative under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 the Moriarty court reasoned that such
service could be effective only if the defendant met the qualifica-
Rule 4(e) and Rule 4(i)(1)(D). The court sustained jurisdiction, despite the defendant's lim-
ited contacts with Connecticut, by holding that a federal court may properly exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over an alien defendant in federal question cases if the alien's contacts
with the United States satisfy the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 397 F. Supp.
at 290. If these contacts are sufficient, the court continued, the only restriction on the place
of trial would be the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id. For a discussion of the Cry-
omedics decision, see 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (1976).
" Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 289-90 (D. Conn. 1975).
" Id. at 290; Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1973);
First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 739 (E.D. Tenn. 1962);
Note, Corporate Amenability to Process in the Federal Courts: State or Federal Jurisdic-
tional Standards?, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1131, 1147 (1964). See also ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION
OF JURISDICTION BErwEFN STATE AND FEDERAL Couirrs §§ 2372(a), 2374(b) (1968).
To the extent that an independent jurisdictional standard under the aggregate contacts
test may geographically broaden corporate amenability to suit, issues of due process and
equal protection may legitimately be raised. Cf. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425
U.S. 637, 645-46 & n.6 (1976) (geographically broader venue available against out-of-state
corporation could create equal protection problem). It appears, however, that courts have
generally avoided an extreme application of the theory. Few courts have implemented the
aggregate contacts test in the absence of any contact between the defendant and the forum
district. For example, in Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973),
although the court sustained jurisdiction where the alien had business activities only in
states other than the forum state, the court granted a transfer on forum non conveniens
grounds. Id. at 359.
u 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
81 Id. at 384.
1w Id. at 390.
= Id. & n.2.
8 Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)).
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tions for amenability set forth in the state's long-arm statute. 7 The
court was therefore compelled to undertake a long-arm jurisdic-
tional analysis.
The persuasive impact of Moriarty's dictum appears to have
been diminished by this procedural impracticability. Subse-
quently, courts addressing the aggregate contacts test in antitrust
litigation have generally qualified its value as a jurisdictional pred-
icate: a defendant's contacts with the United States may be one
factor in establishing jurisdiction pursuant to state statute."'
Incorporating the national contacts test into section 12, some
courts have reasoned that by authorizing nationwide service of pro-
cess, Congress legislatively granted the federal courts nationwide
personal jurisdiction in antitrust actions.89 This view has been
11 Id. at 390. Role 4(e) authorizes service of process to be made upon parties not found
within the forum "under the circumstances and in the manner" prescribed by state statute.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(e)(2). The Moriarty court concluded that the phrase "under the circum-
stances" referred to state standards of amenability, 289 F. Supp. at 390. Thus, when service
is made in a manner authorized by state law, the federal courts must also comply with state
jurisdictional standards. Id.; accord, Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 n.2 (7th Cir.
1979); Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1977); Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416-18 (9th Cir. 1977); Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F.
Supp. 1355, 1357 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1978); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 14, § 1075
(1969).
When a federal court implements the process provisions of Rule 4 that are operative
without reference to state law, see FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)-(6), 4(i), it is able to do so without
being subject to the substantive jurisdictional criteria of the states. Gkiafis v. Steamship
Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 548-59 (4th Cir. 1965); Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355,
1357-58 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1978). Rule 4(i) prescribes methods of serving process in foreign coun-
tries when a federal or state law authorizes service. Occasionally, plaintiffs have successfully
invoked Rule 4(i) pursuant to state long-arm statutes, even without undertaking an analysis
of the defendants' contacts with the state. In Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F.
Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975), for example, the court permitted the aggregation of the defen-
dant's national contacts on a theory of territorial sovereignty for the purpose of satisfying
Connecticut's corporate long-arm statute and, in turn, utilizing Rule 4(i)(1)(D)'s manner of
service. See 397 F. Supp. at 288-91. It is submitted, however, that when service pursuant to
state law under Rule 4(e) is not authorized because the defendant does not have sufficient
contacts with the state to permit use of its long-arm statute, see 2 MooRE, supra note 21,
4.41-1, service under Rule 4(i) is impermissable, see E. Walters & Co. v. Interastra, S.A., 67
F.R.D. 410, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
" See Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 668
(D.N.H. 1977); cf. Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975)
(patent infringement case).
" See Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1977). One theory upon
which nationwide jurisdiction may be premised is that § 12 implicitly incorporates the juris-
dictional standards of the state of final process by providing that a defendant may be served
in the district in which it is an inhabitant or is found. Similar treatment of the amenability
problem has been given under another extraterritorial process provision. In Coleman v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968), the plaintiff brought a
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adopted in interpretations of similar statutory provisions." For ex-
ample, although the venue and nationwide service clauses of the
securities laws" do not expressly address in personam jurisdiction,
it has been held that "it is reasonable to infer that Congress meant
to assert personal jurisdiction" to the limits allowed by the fifth
amendment's due process clause.2 Where nationwide service is
statutorily permitted, therefore, a defendant will be "found" within
the United States and thereby subject to federal in personam juris-
diction, if it has "sufficient contacts with the United States to sup-
port the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United
States court."93 Concomitantly, where process is served within the
United States pursuant to a nationwide service clause, jurisdiction
personal injury action in the Southern District of New York. Id. at 251. Under the "100-mile
bulge" provision of Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant served a
third-party complaint on a Pennsylvania corporation at its principal place of business in
Philadelphia. The third-party defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the 100-mile bulge provision allowed extraterritorial service only
where the out-of-state parties were already subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
court. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when service
is made extraterritorially within the 100-mile bulge, it will be valid if the parties served have
sufficient contacts with the state of service to be subject to suit there. Id. at 252-53. Under
this view, plaintiffs seeking to utilize the extraterritorial provision of Rule 4(f) must look to
the state of service to determine a defendant's amenability. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 14, § 1127. It is similarly true that a defendant served under § 12 will be subject
to the general jurisdiction of the district of final service by virtue of its inhabitancy or being
"found" there.
11 See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 2710, 2721 (1979) (White, J., dissent-
ing) (15 U.S.C. § 78aa); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1114 (1979) (28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)); Misko v. United States, 77 F.R.D. 425, 427 (D.D.C.
1978) (28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)); Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656, 660 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (15
U.S.C. § 78aa); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Md. 1971) (15 U.S.C. §§ 77v,
78aa).
For a compilation of federal statutes prescribing extradistrict service of process, see 2
MooRE, supra note 21, 4.33, 4.42[1].
9215 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa (1976).
92 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972).
13 Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1979) (interpreting securities
laws); see Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114
(1979); Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1977). But see 2 MOORE, supra
note 21, 4.2515], at 262; cf. Note, "Doing Business": Defining State Control Over Foreign
Corporations, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1105, 1112-13 (1979) (minimum contacts, not fairness, should
be the inquiry).
In Fitzsimmons, a securities fraud action, the seventh circuit drew upon Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), in support of a nationwide jurisdictional approach. 589 F.2d at 332-
33. The court suggested that the fairness standard of Shaffer refers not to the fairness of
imposing the burdens of litigation in a distant forum upon a defendant but to the fairness of
the exercise of judicial power by a particular sovereign. Id. at 333.
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is not truly obtained extraterritorially;94 thus, the sole relevant con-
stitutional inquiry in the case of a domestic defendant is whether
service of process was reasonably calculated to provide it with ac-
tual notice. 5
Only when personal jurisdiction is exercised over a defendant
not resident within the United States, does service become truly
extraterritorial. Whether an alien defendant is "present" within
the United States for jurisdictional purposes, therefore, entails an
inquiry into the substantiality and foreseeability of its domestic
contacts." In assuming this posture, federal courts may dispose of
the jurisdictional issue in a fairly summary manner and may re-
solve questions of fairness and convenience by reference to the
traditionally subordinate concepts of venue and forum non
conveniens57
TOWARD A MORE UNIFORM STANDARD
From the foregoing, it can be seen that the issue of personal
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws has not received uniform
treatment. The multiplicity of approaches, each varying in scope
and derivation, appears counterproductive in light of the national
applicability of the antitrust laws. Indeed, the strong federal regu-
latory interest in the antitrust field would not seem to admit of
such diverse enforcement. 8 Congressional intent to accord plain-
" See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114
(1979); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); 2 MOoRE, supra note 21,
4.25[5], at 26Q-61.
5 Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 391 (D.R.I. 1977), modified, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
," Garner v. Enright, 71 F.R.D. 656, 660-61 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F.
Supp. 909, 912-13 (D. Md. 1971).
"7 See Athletes Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445 F. Supp. 35, 45-46 (D. Del.
1977); I.S. Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1023, 1024-25 (D.
Minn. 1976); Phillip Gall & Son v. Garcia Corp., 340 F. Supp. 1255, 1258 (E.D. Ky. 1972).
See also 7 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 158, 159 n.9, 165 (1975). One court has suggested that in authoriz-
ing nationwide service of process, Congress may have tacitly accepted the possibility that
corporations charged with antitrust violations would have to endure suits in distant forums.
The court reasoned that Congress' paramount concern was its regulatory interest in compel-
ling defendants to defend where the plaintiff incurred his injuries. Oxford First Corp. v.
PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
11 See Note, The Role'of State Law in Federal Antitrust ireble Damage Actions, 75
HARv. L. REv. 1395, 1401-02 (1962). The Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), seems to indicate that consideration of the substantive
issues involved may be appropriate in jurisdictional determinations. The Court stated that
much will depend on "the quality and the nature of the activity in relation to the fair and
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tiffs the broadest procedural latitude consistent with the Constitu-
tion underscores the need for a single durable standard." As a mat-
ter of fairness, moreover, a single jurisdictional standard would
apprise a corporation of the quantitative and qualitative activities
which could reasonably be expected to subject it to the personal
jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Additionally, as a deter-
rent measure, a national uniform standard would be less conducive
to strategic exploitation by defendants bent on jurisdictional
evasion.'°0
It has been demonstrated that none of the possible jurisdic-
tional sources previously explored is entirely satisfactory, either on
its merits or in its practicability.101 Despite its intuitive appeal, the
utility of the aggregate contacts test of amenability is severely cir-
cumscribed in the context of alien corporations by the absence of
proper procedural devices to effect service abroad.0 2 On the other
hand, section 12 of the Clayton Act, indefinite in both nature and
scope, has promoted analytical imprecision and tentativeness on
the part of courts interpreting its provisions. 0 3 When taken in con-
junction, however, these two sources may provide a comprehensive
statutory scheme.
It seems that standardization of jurisdictional criteria in the
antitrust context would best be facilitated by a liberal construction
of section 12 and its complements in the Federal Rules, consistent
with the intent of Congress to free federal service of process and
jurisdictional standards from the territorial restrictions incumbent
orderly administration of the laws." Id. at 319; see K. BREWSTE, supra note 9, § 4.1.1. See
also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
" Section 12 was enacted in 1914 as a supplement to § 7 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat.
210 (1890); see 51 CoNG. REc. 9417 (1914), which had limited the judicial district in which an
antitrust proceeding could be brought to that in which the defendant resided or was found.
Under the venue provisions of § 7, most, if not all, antitrust prosecutions were brought in the
district in which the defendant was incorporated. See id at 9416. In terms of practical and
economic realities, therefore, antitrust plaintiffs prior to the enactment of § 12 were faced
with the onerous dilemma of either suing in multiple forums or selectively enforcing their
rights against the more accessible party. To remedy this situation, the "transaction of busi-
ness" test was included in the venue clause of § 12 to permit antitrust plaintiffs to institute
actions in districts in which their injuries were incurred, see id. at 9414, 9415, 9467, 9608,
which would more frequently coincide with their own places of residence. Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 373-74 (1927). For a discussion of the
period leading up to the revision of the antitrust laws, see Levy, The Clayton Law-An
Imperfect Supplement to the Sherman Law, 3 VA. L. Rav. 411, 414-17 (1916).
,oo See generally note 28 and accompanying text supra.
,o, See notes 20-97 and accompanying text supra.
' See notes 85-87 and accompanying text supra.
,o See notes 37-45 and accompanying text supra.
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on state courts. It is submitted that section 12 provides a jurisdic-
tional plan of sufficient range to reach alien defendants if it is
viewed as a codification of the aggregate contacts theory. Under
this uniform approach, a foreign corporation could be sued in any
district, provided its aggregate contacts with the United States
make it fair and reasonable to subject it to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts." 4 Due process in such cases, therefore, would be a
function of the magnitude and foreseeability of the anticompetitive
effects in the United States and the sufficiency of the alien's other
American contacts.10 5
Although a defendant may be amenable to a federal court's
jurisdictional reach under this view of section 12, service of process
on the alien may neverthless be problematic. Where service on
aliens could not be made in the United States, however, section 12
authorizes service "wherever [the corporation] may be found."' '
That federal process is thereby given a worldwide reach is a reason-
able inference to be drawn from the language of the statute. 7 With
a statutorily authorized service provision, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides the manner of serving defendants both do-
mestically and abroad, without resort to state procedure.1es Fur-
"' See notes 78-79, 96 and accompanying text supra.
Many courts that have refused to implement an aggregation theory of jurisdiction have
done so on the ground that Congress had not provided for nationwide service of process for
the particular claim asserted. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556
F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (trademark infringement); Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus.,
Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 1302, 1304-05 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (patent infringement); Graham Eng'r
Corp. v. Kemp Prods., Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 919-20 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v.
Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 400 (D. Neb. 1976) (patent claim). But cf. Stanley v.
Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F. Supp. 1267, 1271 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967)
(courts imply that when extraterritorial service of process clause was available, such clause
did not authorize service outside the United States).
,o See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
208 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976); see note 1 and accompanying text supra.
" See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 262, 329-30
(E.D. Pa. 1975); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F. Supp. 70, 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1965). See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-40 (2d
Cir. 1972); SEC v. Briggs, 234 F. Supp. 618, 622-23 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
108 Rule 4(i) sets forth five methods of serving process when a federal or state statute
authorizes service in a foreign country. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Judicial construction of the Rule
has expansively included within its purview those statutes that authorize service by reasona-
ble implication, if not expressly. See 2 MOORE, supra note 21, 4.45. Section 22(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1976), and § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), which contain provisions similar to that of § 12 of the Clayton
Act, have been held to be proper statutory predicates for the implementation of service
under Rule 4(i). E.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 1000 n.61 (2d Cir.), cert.
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thermore, since the alien venue statute will not rectify jurisdic-
tional abuses,109 it is implicit in this broad interpretation of section
12 that federal transfer provisions would continue to operate as a
de facto limitation on federal jurisdictional power.110 Thus, little, if
any, legislative action would be necessary to permit the effectua-
tion of this federal standard."'
CONCLUSION
In the 50 years since the enactment of section 12 of the Clay-
ton Act, the federal courts have not formulated a consistent rule on
the amenability of antitrust violators and service of process on
these defendants. This may reflect a determination by the courts
that, if resolution of the jurisdictional issue in a particular case is
possible by resort to more traditional predicates, creation of a uni-
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); SEC v. Briggs, 234 F. Supp. 618, 621-22 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
Since Scophony and decisions of like tenor predated the enactment of Rule 4(i), their restric-
tion of antitrust process to the territorial United States does not lead inescapably to the
conclusion that such a rule obtains today.
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules provides that "[e]ach district court by action of a majority
of judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not
inconsistent with these rules . . . .In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." FED. R. Civ. P.
83. Before the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, see note 4 supra,
courts seeking to assert in personam jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns sanctioned the use of
this ad hoc provision to fashion a means of service when existing rules of procedure were
unavailing. See, e.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 108-09 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 59 F.R.D.
530 (D.D.C. 1973). But see Oster v. Dominion of Can., 144 F. Supp. 746, 748 (N.D.N.Y.),
aff'd sub nom. Clay v. Dominion of Can., 238 F.2d 400 (1956), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936
(1957); Clark County v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 28, 32 (D. Nev. 1950). See generally
National Amer. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 635-36 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979). Thus, although Rule 83 provides an arguable means
of avoiding obeisance to state laws of amenability by making the manner of service subject
only to judicial order, it fails to afford a uniform resolution of the service problems.
'c' See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
e0 e notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra.
m One court has implemented this synthesis of statutory and extrastatutory approaches
with no apparent affront to traditional notions of due process. Scriptomatic, Inc. v. Agfa-
Gevaert, Inc., [1973-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (jurisdiction under
securities law). Several authorities have urged a similar jurisdictional approach. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1977); Smit,
International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1031, 1039 n.45 (1961).
Similarly, when the defendants are domestic corporations, the national contacts ap-
proach would create in personam jurisdiction in any district court. See notes 77, 93-95 and
accompanying text supra. Section 12's venue criteria, of course, would restrict the place of
suit and ensure a significant degree of forum connection.
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form, albeit purely prospective, jurisdictional policy may be inap-
propriate. Inconsistency in the application of the antitrust laws
would seem to undermine the strong federal interest in this area.
But more significantly, this ad hoc treatment may allow some de-
fendants, particularly aliens, to evade antitrust liability, although
their perpetration of antitrust violations having direct and foresee-
able effects in the country has effectively removed any due process
obstacles to the assertion of jurisdiction by United States courts.
If section 12 is interpreted liberally, Congress' intent to render
the antitrust defendant more accessible would be advanced. In
addition, the alien corporation would be advised of the character and
extent of activity that could reasonably be expected to subject it to
liability. Moreover, although the national framework posed by the
aggregate contacts theory may seem unfamiliar, the evaluation of
jurisdictional contacts is a task routinely undertaken by federal
courts on a microcosmic scale and therefore would not seem to exact
an undue burden in its application. It is likely, nonetheless, that
section 12 will continue to foster confusion and interpolation unless a
single approach is adopted or the statute is clarified legislatively to
define both its jurisdictional nature and its precise scope. Such
clarification would forestall the implementation of state procedural
conventions by plaintiffs who may be unaware of section 12's
jurisdictional import or who underestimate its reach.
Elaine T. Ryan
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